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EU PROCEDURAL LAW  
 
Prof. Andrea Biondi and Ravi S. Mehta1 
 
Abstract  
This chapter explores the procedural dimension of the process of European 
integration. This is a potentially vast area, both in terms of scope (given the now 
extremely extended substantive EU competences) and in terms of sources as it is 
based on both case law and harmonizing measures. It is also closely intertwined 
with well-established rules in national legal systems. Despite several reforms of EU 
competences, the enforcement of EU rights is still largely carried out by national 
procedures and courts, subject however to the respect of certain general limitations 
imposed by the Court of Justice of the European Union. In order to provide a 
systematization of this heterogeneous field, we analyze it through the prism of the 
EU Treaties and through three key features of EU procedural law: (a) the basic 
protections which are guaranteed within the context of EU law (b) the flexibility for 
national legal systems to retain their internal logic and (c) the desire to establish EU 
standards of procedural protection. The “classification” of the copious acquis 
communitaire this reveals, allows a critical view to be taken of the judicial analysis of 
the interests at issue to date. 
 
Introduction 
EU Procedural law is a potentially vast and heterogeneous area, which has 
been the subject of considerable academic analysis.2 It is particularly difficult to 
delimit the scope of our inquiry since the concept of a “procedural” rule is in itself 
difficult to define,3 and a study of the area could potentially encompass many 
different legal principles and mechanisms. When taking a broad view of the topic, 
however, there are striking features. The first is that it is torn between contrasting 
dynamics: its genesis is driven by very different processes (sometimes legislative or 
proactive, sometimes judicial or responsive), and its underlying philosophy is often 
inspired by heterogeneous national legal systems. For instance, the approach to the 
rights of defence in competition procedures elicits various responses from common 
law and civil law countries. The second is that – in the fiftieth year after Van Gend en 
Loos4 – there is a high level of integration at the procedural level between EU and 
national law which, at times, has wrought significant changes on national 
procedures.5 
Like Magritte’s famous surrealist depiction of a pipe, we will begin by 
identifying what this chapter is not about. We will not consider (i) the procedural 
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rules in the area of EU criminal law (ii) harmonization initiatives adopted in the last 
decade, (iii) so-called “substantive” procedural rules (such as the quantification of 
damages6) or (iv) rules applicable to the EU institutions, e.g., interim relief against an 
EU institution. Whilst undoubtedly important, these initiatives are often sectorally 
specific and remain the exception to the rule that national systems are the 
implementers of EU law.  
Instead, in this entry, we would like to re-examine the case law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) through the prism of the modern structure of 
the foundational Treaties of the EU: the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
Traditionally branded as “national procedural autonomy,”7 EU remedies law 
has engendered significant scholarship and case law for many decades8 and is often 
explored through a “core narrative” (as Michael Dougan calls it9). Professor 
Dougan’s chapter provides an elegant and compelling account of that history and 
the determining features of this area.  
We believe, however, that the Treaty structure recasts this debate. In our 
view, such a structure provides three “focal points” through which to view the core 
principles, on a spectrum of analysis of the interrelationship between national 
procedures and EU law. Whilst we accept that this is not a “bulletproof” model 
explaining every case or context-specific result, we believe it to be the most coherent 
way in which to approach the underlying principles which have emerged over time. 
Moreover, it accurately expresses three key new features of this area: (1) the 
calibration of the general framework to different substantive fields; (2) its 
reconceptualization as a facet of EU fundamental rights protection, and; (3) the 
potential for substantive regulation of national procedures at the EU level. 
Ultimately, this variability reflects the inherent nature of procedural law in national 
legal systems – sensitive to the context and interests at play. However, it is important 
to identify the different and often opposing interests involved rather than conflating 
them. We will conduct a concrete study of the interaction between national res 
judicata principles and EU law as an illustration of the challenges and limitations of 
the current framework. 
All Roads Lead to Lisbon: Three Gateways for a Common Framework 
The Lisbon Treaty has reshaped the structure of the positive law of the EU, 
“mark[ing] a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union” (Article 1, 
second indent TEU). For EU procedural law, this has led to the formal establishment 
of three focal points which reflect the issues involved: 
At one extreme, are general principles of EU law, which have “constitutional 
status”10 including the general principle of “effective judicial protection”. These are 
often described as “filling the gaps”, amorphous and even hierarchically superior to 
the provisions of the Treaty.11 Relevant general principles are also expressly 
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acknowledged in the Treaty, for instance in Article 6(3) TEU. They arguably 
establish the outer limits within which national procedures must remain.  
In the middle of our spectrum are two provisions which recognize the balancing of 
national and EU interests required at the procedural level: 
― Article 4(2) TEU recognizes the respect which the Union must give to 
the “national identities” of the Member States, including their 
“constitutional” structures. This would logically include national 
procedural systems. Article 4(3) TEU then sets out the duty of “sincere 
cooperation” incumbent on Member States as a corollary to that 
diversity.  This includes a duty to (a) “take any appropriate measure, 
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out 
of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the 
Union” (second indent) and (b) to “facilitate the achievement of the 
Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise 
the attainment of the Union’s objectives” (third indent). Article 4 TEU 
is therefore a schizophrenic provision which requires a balancing of 
competing interests; 
― Article 19(1), second indent TEU is a new provision which specifically 
states that “Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure 
effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.” Its 
placement in the general provision which concerns the functions of the 
CJEU illustrates the vision of Member State remedies as a tool for the 
implementation of EU law. 
Finally, the Treaties recognize the possibility for substantive regulation at the EU 
level: 
― Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (incorporated by 
Article 6(1) TEU), recognizes an individual’s “right to an effective 
remedy,“ wherever Member States are implementing EU law. While 
this cannot be said to create “new” rights, its influence arguably 
requires greater intervention by the EU courts in a substantive 
assessment of national procedures; 
― The TFEU goes further, explicitly recognizing competences to 
harmonize procedural law in the areas of judicial cooperation (Articles 
81 and 82 TFEU), the creation of sanctions for so-called “Euro crimes” 
(Article 83(1) TFEU), police cooperation (Article 87 TFEU), language 
arrangements and rules governing the creation of European intellectual 
property rights (Article 118 TFEU), administrative cooperation (Article 
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197(1)–(2) TFEU) and combating fraud (Article 325(4)). As we will note 
briefly below, there has been a substantial proliferation of 
harmonization measures in recent years. 
So much for our cardinal “focal points.” We do not suggest that they are unrelated – 
this will turn on the facts before a court. Indeed, the Explanations to the Charter 
expressly link Article 47 to the concept of effective judicial protection.12  However, 
we suggest that they express the different tensions which this area of law raises: (a) 
the basic protections guaranteed within the context of EU law (b) the flexibility for 
national legal systems to retain their internal logic and (c) the desire to establish EU 
standards of procedural protection. 
Interestingly, the CJEU appears to approach this tripartite structure as a distinction 
without a difference, entering all three gateways to arrive at the same destination. 
Perhaps the best illustration of this is the most recent authoritative exposition in the 
Grand Chamber’s judgment in Unibet13: 
38. Under the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 10 EC, it is for the 
Member States to ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights under 
Community law[…]. 
 
39. […] in the absence of Community rules governing the matter, it is for the 
domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals 
having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions 
for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law […]. 
 
40. Although the EC Treaty has made it possible in a number of instances for private 
persons to bring a direct action, where appropriate, before the Community Court, it 
was not intended to create new remedies in the national courts to ensure the 
observance of Community law other than those already laid down by national law 
[…]. 
 
41. It would be otherwise only if it were apparent from the overall scheme of the 
national legal system in question that no legal remedy existed which made it possible 
to ensure, even indirectly, respect for an individual rights under Community law 
[…]. 
 
42. Thus, while it is, in principle, for national law to determine an individuals [sic] 
standing and legal interest in bringing proceedings, Community law nevertheless 
requires that the national legislation does not undermine the right to effective 
judicial protection […]. 
 
43. […] the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an 
individuals rights under Community law must be no less favourable than those 
governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not render 
practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by 
Community law (principle of effectiveness) […]. 
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Whilst the CJEU treats our three focal points as facets of a common principle, we 
explore below how the Treaty structure seems to reflect distinct considerations and 
tendencies. 
 
Exploring the Gateways 
The general principle of “effective judicial protection” was first recognized in the 
Johnston14 case as a corollary to Articles 6 and 13 ECHR. It reflects “an irreducible 
core of protection”15 for a party by means of access to a judicial process, i.e., where 
an individual has no remedy at all, EU law will step in to provide one. On a number 
of occasions, the Court has clearly stated that this principle exists independently of 
considerations of the “effectiveness” of remedies.16 
The principle is best illustrated by Johnston and Unibet. In Johnston, an employee 
could not bring a claim for sex discrimination in an Industrial Tribunal because a 
national provision allowed the Secretary of State to certify – conclusively - that her 
case concerned national security and that derogations from the principle of non-
discrimination were therefore justified. In stark terms, the CJEU characterized such a 
rule as “depriv[ing] an individual of the possibility of asserting by judicial process 
the rights conferred by the directive” (para 20) and therefore falling afoul of the 
general principle. In contrast, in Unibet it was held that the principle did not require 
national law to create a free-standing action for the enforcement of EU law, if other 
effective legal remedies – no less favorable than those governing similar domestic 
actions – achieved the same result. Similarly, in cases where national law has vested 
jurisdiction to resolve disputes concerning EU rights in specifically designated 
tribunals or specific procedures,17 there is no vacuum which requires the creation of 
a remedy to ensure the effective protection of EU rights.  
Other examples of judicial responses to a vacuum include the creation of new EU 
remedies, “such as damages liability of the Member States or of a private party.”18 
Thus, the CJEU created the principle of State Liability in the absence of an explicit 
textual basis in the Treaties.19 It has required the creation of an interim remedy even 
where none had previously existed in national law, in order to ensure the effective 
protection of EU rights.20 It also recognized the possibilities for horizontal actions 
between private parties on the basis of a breach of competition law.21 
We see this as distinct from the other “focal points” we have identified. It is clear 
that the principle does not bite where national law merely imposes preconditions on 
the access to a court, such as requiring the parties to submit to a prior mandatory 
settlement procedure.22 Commentators – and, it appears, Advocate Generals – have 
approached the principle of effectiveness and the principle of effective judicial 
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protection as expressions of each other.23 However, this dilutes the strength of the 
latter principle, and mischaracterizes its object – which is to step in where there is a 
right without a remedy. Properly construed, many of the cases where the CJEU has 
referred to that principle have not really engaged it at all since there was no absence 
of a remedy for it to address. A proper example was Kadi (no 1) albeit in the context 
of EU procedures, in which the Court found a breach of the general principle since 
individuals had no means of making any representations to the body that listed 
them for the UN’s asset-freezing.24 Whether other aspects of EU procedural law are 
also engaged in a given case may calibrate the standard of review applied and shift 
the case along the spectrum of analysis, but this should not change the principle’s 
purity as one of the “focal points.” 
A useful way of testing this is to examine the adjacent “focal point” on the spectrum 
– the most prolific in terms of the case law. The Treaty provisions following the 
Lisbon Treaty (Articles 4 and 19 TEU) demonstrate the careful balancing act that is 
needed between expectations of “cooperation” from the Member States and the 
autonomy which national systems are given within EU law.  
One of the distinguishing features of the EU system (in contrast, for instance, to 
federal models) is that national courts are co-opted to be the front line enforcers of 
EU law. Like every good story, the procedural narrative between EU and national 
legal systems began with a couple – here the Rewe25 and Comet26 cases – which 
established the two requirements now reflected in the Treaties. The decentralized 
enforcement of Union law requires that (1) rules governing EU-based claims cannot 
be less favorable than those relating to similar domestic actions (“equivalence”) and 
(2) they cannot make it impossible in practice or excessively difficult to exercise EU 
rights (“effectiveness”). Some commentators have emphasized the cooperative 
nature of this framework, in contrast to – for instance – the “conflict-oriented” model 
in cases such as Simmenthal.27 
 The key features of this extensive case law are threefold. First, the minutiae, as 
well as the control over the basic tenets of the domestic legal system and the role of a 
given national procedural rule within that system, are left in the hands of national 
legal orders.28 As such, they are empowered to be the ones to enforce EU law, the 
latter only creating new remedies where there is a lacuna at the national level (the 
first “focal point” above).  
Second, the assessment of equivalence and effectiveness provides robust 
latitude for Member States, and EU Courts will often cede the difficult balancing act 
between competing substantive interests to the national legal order. An illustration 
of this is the Court’s cautious case law on limitation periods which has for some time 
allowed significant margins to Member States when identifying what a “reasonable” 
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period would be.29 The CJEU in many ways keeps an “escape route” for itself to step 
in where the imbalance is clear, but otherwise remains above the fray.30 This is more 
likely to be triggered in cases where secondary legislation has already incited 
national legal systems to provide “penalties [which are] effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive”.31 Given the widespread use of this vague terminology in Directives32 
and the absence of guidance as to the meaning of those terms, it would appear that 
litigation is likely to arise on the question of the necessary remedies at the national 
level.33  
Third, over time the Court’s approach has matured to allow for corrective 
mechanisms to address some of the potential inconsistencies of its logic. For 
instance, it has recognized the ability of national legal systems to enforce principles 
such as “abuse of rights” to stop parties relying upon EU law in a manner contrary 
to its underlying objectives.34 Moreover, the Court has insisted that the natural logic 
of the principle of equivalence is that there should be an internal consistency 
between remedies for EU rights inter se.35 
 This nuanced framework is a classic creature of EU law, incorporating the 
tensions at play between legal orders and respecting the autonomy of national 
systems within the EU. In light of the features above, the intervention of EU law is 
likely to occur only where there is either a clear difference between national 
procedures and those for enforcing EU rights, or where there are clear obstacles 
placed in the path of persons relying on those rights, which have no corollary in the 
underlying secondary EU legislation which is the origin of the EU rights.  
Thus far, the “focal points” we have considered appear limited in nature, 
either biting only where there is a vacuum to be filled or where there are clear 
obstacles strewn across the path of those relying on EU rights. However, two 
developments have heralded a substantive regulation of national procedures: (a) the 
emphasis on the individual rights of parties to an effective remedy and (b) efforts to 
harmonize procedural standards at the EU level.  
As to the first development, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
contains a number of guarantees. However, in general terms, the CJEU’s approach to 
that provision appears to be quite limited in the context of procedural law. Indeed, 
the Third Chamber recently stated that “Article 47 of the Charter […] constitutes a 
reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection.”36 This would suggest 
that it does little more than reflect our first “focal point.” However, in our view this 
statement and the judicial approach which consists of limiting Article 47 to other 
principles has been adopted in specific circumstances where the particular complaint 
is analogous to that which is the focus of the general principle of effective judicial 
protection. The Explanations of Article 47 make clear that it is not solely concerned 
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with that general principle. Instead, Article 47 recognizes the importance of a 
separate interest – that of individual parties to an “effective remedy” where their 
rights have been infringed. This is an individual right rather than a systemic 
principle. It appears that the judiciary takes a similar view, as noted recently by a 
member of the Court37.  
A powerful example of this shift in philosophy is DEB.38 DEB was a German 
company which applied for legal aid in support of its claim for state liability against 
the German State for delay in its transposition of two directives. German law 
effectively precluded it from bringing this claim, as it (i) required the company to 
make an advance payment to the court in respect of the costs of the proceedings and 
be represented by a lawyer (things it could not afford as it was out of funds) and (ii) 
imposed restrictions on legal persons from applying for legal aid. The CJEU was 
specifically informed by the referring court that the Bundesverfassungsgericht had not 
taken issue with this restriction under the German Basic Law (paragraph 24). 
However, the CJEU noted the “right of a legal person to effective access to justice 
and […] the general principle of effective judicial protection” (paragraph 29), and 
“recast the question referred so that it relates to the interpretation of the principle of 
effective judicial protection as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter” (paragraph 33). It 
then examined at length the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on 
legal aid under Article 6(1) ECHR and concluded that “it is not impossible for legal 
persons to rely upon [Article 47]” (paragraph 59). It went on to set out a framework 
of analysis for the national court (paragraphs 60–62). While the Court referred to 
case law under the second “focal point” and the “virtually impossible or excessively 
difficult” formula, this was arguably a substantial interference with the rules of 
national law and may herald an increased willingness to enforce substantive 
guarantees where parties allege that their fundamental right under Article 47 has 
been infringed.  
The second development of note is the proliferation of positive harmonization 
measures, which have had the direct consequence of calibrating the test applied by 
the Court when examining national procedural rules. The EU legislator has been 
busy: as has been noted elsewhere,39 measures have been introduced in areas 
ranging from public procurement, to sex discrimination, consumer protection, 
environmental protection, and the enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
Furthermore, extensive rules concerning civil and criminal justice have been 
adopted.40 This legislative activity, in our view, explains the variations in the case 
law which are context-specific. For instance, in the field of consumer law the Court 
has repeatedly insisted, in contrast to its more general case law, that national judges 
raise ex officio questions of EU law which arise in a case.41 In the area of IP law, the 
CJEU has lent the weight of its authority to the idea of a pan-European injunction 
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against infringements of Community trademarks.42 Similarly, in the area of 
environmental protection the Court has intervened to generate new remedies where 
necessary.43 Finally, its case law in the field of employment has placed particular 
duties on national courts to ensure the respect of EU law,44 as well as to guarantee 
the existence of effective sanctions.45 The Court has also adopted a more 
interventionist view of limitation periods to that alluded to above.46 
Somewhere “In-Between”: the Court’s Treatment of Res Judicata 
As soon as academic hubris tempts one towards systematizing, the question 
of hard cases which fall “in-between” quickly rears its head. For instance, can the 
three “focal points” explain the way in which EU law deals with one of the most 
sacred principles of procedural law: res judicata? Delivery of justice within a society 
requires finality in litigation, despite the possibility that mistakes, new facts and 
other events might emerge in the future. In recent years, several cases raised the 
question whether EU law requires national courts to ignore the finality of their 
previous judgments in order to provide for an effective judicial remedy to breaches 
of an EU right. The conflict is there to be seen: in one corner, respect for the principle 
of res judicata ensures legal certainty and closure within the national legal order (and 
engages the flexibility of our second focal point); in the other, the vulnus to an EU 
right would be left unhealed without a remedy (suggesting the need for intervention 
to protect the core guarantees of our first focal point and to ensure consistent EU-
wide standards under our third). The CJEU’s initial reaction fell into our second 
“focal point”: thus in Kapferer, the Court ecumenically recognized the fundamental 
importance for both the EU47 and national legal orders, of the principle of res judicata. 
It concluded that “Community law does not require a national court to disapply 
domestic rules of procedure conferring finality on a decision, even if to do so would 
enable it to remedy an infringement of Community law by the decision at issue.”48 A 
few months later, however, in the Lucchini judgment the CJEU found that Italian 
provisions ensuring the principle of res judicata must not be applied in so far as their 
application prevented the exercise of an EU right – in that case the recovery of state 
aid granted in breach of EU law.49 Finally in Olimpiclub, although the Court confined 
Lucchini to the specific area of exclusive EU competences – such as state aid control –
it still went on to hold that the Italian Supreme Court’s interpretation of the principle 
of res judicata in tax disputes would lead to results incompatible with EU VAT law 
and thus it had to be set aside.50 In all these cases, the national procedural system in 
question was supposed to have functioned properly as the appeals process, counter 
claims, evidence, opportunity to raise new pleas and so on were all in place. There 
was no vacuum to be filled by looking through our first focal point. Moreover, no 
legal system provides for an absolute bar to reopening proceedings, thus a mere 
application of the equivalence test should have sufficed. Instead in Lucchini and 
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Olimpiclub the CJUE substantially intervened to overturn what it perceived to be 
flawed national adjudications. In the first case the Italian court had disregarded a 
previous Commission decision, and in the second the Court resisted a certain 
reading of the res judicata principle that would have meant applying an incorrect 
interpretation of VAT law in all future cases related to the same taxpayer or taxable 
entity, although for different tax years. These rulings are therefore more related to 
the preservation of the coherence and exclusive competences of the EU legal system 
as a whole rather than being concerned with a remedial outcome. When faced with 
these types of fundamental tensions between legal orders, the Court’s results shade 
between the protection of national autonomy and interventionism. As now candidly 
admitted by the Court itself, ultimately it all depends on “the particular features of 
the situations and interests at issue.”51 
Conclusion 
 Where does this leave us? We have tried to recast the extensive developments 
to date through the use of a conceptual framework which mirrors the foundational 
Treaties. We consider this reformulation to be an important clarification, given that 
the case law of the Court so often confuses and combines different concepts in its 
search for a fair result in a given case. In our view, that methodology fails in two 
respects. First, it does not clearly identify what the Court is doing when faced with 
particular facts – a particularly important exercise when it is concerned, as here, with 
the outsourcing of justice to national legal orders. This makes it difficult to discern 
clear principles from the case law or to predict which principles the Court will 
invoke when resolving a dispute. Second, by doing this the Court risks diluting the 
effect of each notion or giving the impression that a given concept is more limited 
than it was initially designed to be. For instance, the general principle of effective 
judicial protection is rarely infringed given that it is invoked in cases where there is 
no vacuum to fill. When left with an analytical framework such as that in Unibet, it is 
hard to expect more than a form of balancing between national and EU interests. 
This is only supposed to occur within the context of our second “focal point” on the 
spectrum, i.e., where there is no underpinning secondary EU legislation in the area, 
no vacuum without remedies, and the rights of the individual party are not 
jeopardized so as to require active intervention. The structural guidance in the 
Treaties may be a more constructive way to measure out the different weights placed 
on the balance. 
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